The deceased was the brother of another recent incident

Investigators found this jumper's gear with the reserve deployed, the reserve's slider all the way down to the risers and both brakes still stowed. The cutaway handle had been pulled, but the reserve ripcord handle was still attached to the harness. The main canopy had released from the harness and was found nearby, still in its deployment bag due to a bag lock malfunction. The main canopy, cutaway handle, reserve pilot chute and freebag were all found within a 20-yard radius of the jumper, which would indicate that the cutaway and reserve deployment took place at very low altitudes, likely lower than 1,000 feet above the ground. The jumper likely struck the ground before his reserve had a chance to fully inflate and slow him down to a survivable descent rate.

After deploying his main canopy, the jumper apparently experienced a bag lock malfunction; however, it's impossible to determine at what altitude he deployed his main. Investigators concluded that the jumper's automatic activation device had deployed his reserve parachute since the reserve closing loop had been cut by the unit's cutter and the reserve ripcord was still in its pocket on the main lift web of the harness. The rig was equipped with a reserve static line, but it was not connected to either riser, and it's unclear whether it was disconnected before or during the jump. Evidence at the scene indicated that the reserve canopy had inflated but did not have enough time to fully slow the jumper before he struck the ground.

Investigators could not determine at what altitude this jumper initiated main canopy deployment. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 2-1 requires that students and A-license holders deploy no lower than 3,000 feet above the ground to allow enough altitude for them to properly handle a main canopy malfunction, with minimum altitudes of 2,500 feet for B-license holders and 2,000 feet for C- and D-license holders. Section 5-1 recommends students and A-license holders decide upon and take action to initiate emergency procedures by 2,500 feet, while B- through D-license holders should do so by 1,800 feet.

Although this jumper pulled his cutaway handle at some point, it's unclear at what altitude. It's also unknown whether his AAD had already deployed his reserve while the main risers and main deployment bag were still attached or if he pulled his cutaway handle to release his main canopy before the AAD activated the reserve. The investigator did not report finding any friction burns on either canopy or line set, indicating that the main and reserve canopies most likely did not rub together during deployment and that the jumper apparently pulled his cutaway handle and released his main canopy before the AAD deployed his reserve.

If the RSL had been hooked up to the main risers, the reserve deployment may have been initiated sooner, saving precious altitude and possibly providing more time for the reserve to slow the jumper before landing. Although the AAD had cut the reserve loop, investigators did not return the unit to the manufacturer to determine what altitude the device actually activated the reserve. According to a representative from the AAD's U.S.-based service center, at least two reasons could explain the low reserve deployment in this jumper's situation: The AAD may have activated the reserve at the unit's preset altitude of 750 feet, but the reserve canopy could have experienced a hesitation during some stage of the deployment and inflation. Just a short delay in any part of the reserve deployment would be enough to make a difference between a safe descent rate and striking the ground at a high rate of speed while the reserve was still inflating. The representative suggested that another possibility was that the inflated main pilot chute and deployment bag may have provided enough drag to slow the jumper below the 78 mph descent rate required to activate the unit. If this was the case and the jumper had pulled his cutaway handle somewhere around 750 feet or slightly higher, it would have taken him a few seconds to reach the necessary speed to activate the AAD, thus initiating the reserve deployment lower than the normal activation height. Still, without the data from the unit or any witness accounts, it's impossible to determine exactly why the reserve did not have enough altitude to slow the jumper to a safe descent rate.

The jumper initially survived the landing, as indicated by the fact that he had removed his rig and was found 30 feet away from his gear. However, either no one noticed that he had not returned from the jump or people thought he had intentionally landed near his trailer where he stayed on the drop zone since it was the last jump of the day. If a skydiver doesn't plan to return to the regular landing area or packing hangar after a jump, he should tell at least one other jumper on the load his plan and make a phone call to manifest after he lands to let them know he landed uneventfully. Some drop zones use a system that requires each jumper to check in with manifest after each load, which can help the DZ determine if a jumper is missing so a search can begin immediately if necessary.

Lastly, the toxicology test conducted on the jumper following the accident indicated a positive test result for the presence of marijuana in a concentration strong enough that the lab technician said the jumper was more than likely under the influence of the drug at the time of his accident. Jumping while under the influence of drugs or alcohol has resulted in injuries and fatalities in the past and is prohibited by the FAA and USPA for good reason. Drugs and alcohol can slow reaction times and cause many other adverse reactions that can lead to skydiving injuries and fatalities.

There were no indications of freefall stability problems in any of this jumper’s previous training skydives. He had successfully met the required tasks on each jump and had also accumulated 40 to 45 minutes of training in a wind tunnel. He may have panicked after realizing he had grabbed his jumpsuit gripper instead of his main pilot chute handle. When he reached across his body toward his right hip with his left arm, it caused him to flip on his back and tumble away from the instructor. The student then appeared to attempt to roll over face to earth, but his de-arched body position kept him in a back-to-earth position.

Skydiver’s Information Manual Section 5-1 recommends that jumpers deploy at an appropriate altitude (no lower than 3,000 feet AGL for students) in a stable, face-to-earth body position; however, a jumper’s priority is to pull at the correct altitude, regardless of body position. SIM Section 4 recommends that students who do not find their main deployment handle on their first try make no more than two additional attempts to locate the handle. If a student still cannot deploy his main, he should immediately pull his reserve ripcord. Although deploying in a face-to-earth position is ideal, it’s more important to deploy at the assigned altitude, regardless of body position. In most cases, a main canopy deployment while a jumper is back to earth has resulted in a successful opening without any malfunction or entanglement.

The automatic activation device did activate this jumper’s reserve at some point, but it’s unknown at what altitude. Investigators found the student with his reserve pilot chute trapped under his arm, with approximately eight feet of reserve bridle out of the container and wrapped around his torso and right arm. This indicates that the reserve deployed while the jumper was spinning on his back, which caused his arm to trap the reserve pilot chute and bridle instead of the pilot chute finding clean air to deploy the reserve.

Just as deploying a main while back to earth almost always results in a normal deployment, the same is true for reserve canopies; entanglements such as this between the jumper and the deploying reserve canopy or its pilot chute or freebag are rare, even if the reserve is deployed in a less-than-desirable body position. Had the reserve pilot chute not been trapped by the jumper’s arm, the result would likely have been a fully deployed reserve parachute.

The instructor attempted to dock with the student once he saw him experiencing a problem with his deployment but was unable to dock and assist before the student rolled over and tumbled away. AFF instructors are trained and evaluated in assisting with student deployments, and it’s a good idea for AFF instructors to stay no more than an arm’s length from each student whenever possible, even when students are performing well during a skydive. All instructors are trained to deploy their own main canopy no lower than 2,000 feet, regardless of whether the student has deployed. The report indicated that this instructor initiated his main canopy deployment at 1,500 feet. By the time his main canopy inflated and began to slow his descent, his AAD had activated his reserve canopy. Even though both canopies inflated properly and he landed without incident, the low deployment placed him at additional risk of a main-reserve entanglement.