The aircraft climbed to approximately 12,000 ft AGL and then ‘ran in’ at approximately 170-180° from north, over the top of the DZ control point and over the PLA.
Once the aircraft was over the exit point, the first three parachutists, including the deceased3, left the aircraft followed shortly after, at various intervals, by the remaining parachutists.
The majority of his free fall descent went without incident, though only he and one of the other parachutists linked together in freefall. At approximately 4,000ft AGL he separated from the other parachutist in order to ‘track’ away to deploy his parachute. At this time a glider was observed to be in close proximity to the three parachutists. Shortly after, at between 3,000 – 4,000ft AGL the glider was seen to collide with him.
The wing from the glider was observed to detach from the fuselage and the glider was then seen to spiral towards the ground. The pilot of the glider was not seen to exit the aircraft. The deceased's reserve parachute was observed to deploy at approximately 700ft AGL. Once the parachute had deployed, no movement was seen from the jumper. He was then observed to land under the parachute on the northern perimeter track of the airfield.
Even though there were systems in place that were intended to prevent this type of accident, it is the Board’s belief that the glider penetrated the agreed exclusion zone, that was intended for parachuting activities only, narrowly missing the other parachutist in free fall and then colliding with the deceased, who was also in free fall. This resulted in the glider wing detaching from the fuselage. The Board believe that the deceased was almost certainly fatally injured as a result of the collision.
The DZ Controller attempted to abort the drop, by ground to aircraft radio. The crew of the aircraft did not hear the call, but the Board believe that when the call was made the parachutists had already left the aircraft.
Phillip Cheasley