|Date||Location||Category||Age||# Jumps||AAD?/RSL?||Dropzone.com Report||Dropzone.com Discussion|
|06/12/1998||Chatteris, England||MAL||29||15||Y/Y|| || |
|Description: The deceased was using a Vector student rig, docile student main, and a square reserve. The main was deployed by sprung loaded extractor pilot chute. The container included FXC AAD with RSL.
The dive plan was for a 5 second day, this students second. The student was the last of a lift of students to exit and was observed by DZ controller on telemeters as well as an experienced jumper on "talkdown" duties in the student landing area. His exit (fom 4,500') and freefall went well and he deployed his main without any sign of instability. On deployment the student was observed to have end cell closures. Shortly after the main canopy opening, his reserve pilot chute was seen to deploy shortly before he cut away the main parachute. The jumper was seen then, to fall away with what appeared to be the reserve freebag in tow. The jumper was found with both handles pulled, the FXC had operated and the reserve was found next to the body with the mouth locks engaged and the suspension lines and bridle line entangled. Initial theory appears to indicate that whilst still under a good main (albeit with work to be done to it) the student decided it was a malfunction and operated his reserve before cutting away. The pilot chute of the reserve did not fully inflate causing the freebag to tumble out of the container, wrapping the deploying lines around the bridle. As this was happening the jumper then cut away, the drogue pilot chute inflated and effectively locked the bag shut.
|Lessons:It would seem that this proves the point that there is no substitute for training and getting to know how to recognise the difference between a "problem" and a bona fide malfunction. Whatever happens, there is NO substitute for carrying out the reserve drills in the correct sequence.|
|BPA Description: A Category 3 parachutist with nine descents was dispatched from the aircraft on a five second free fall descent. Upon exiting he was seen to adopt a de-arched position as he pulled his ripcord. The main canopy was seen to deploy, but not fully develop (a number of cells had not inflated). Shortly after the main canopy had deployed, at approximately 3,500 feet the reserve pilot chute and bridle line were seen to extract from the reserve container. The main was seen to released, after which he was seen to have reserve pilot chute, bridle line, reserve 'free bag' and rigging lines 'in tow.'|
|BPA Conclusions:The conclusions of the Board are that he deployed his main canopy in an unstable position, which may have resulted in the main canopy deploying unevenly. This may have caused the right brake to catch on part of the equipment, releasing it from its 'half brake' configuration (note: one brake was found to be released). As the parachute deployed not all the cells inflated, thereby either causing a malfunction, or causing him to believe he had a malfunction. The Board believe that he attempted to carry out his emergency drills, but carried them out in an incorrect order, deploying his reserve canopy before released his main. The Board believe that because the reserve was deployed before the main was released, the reserve 'free bag' may have turned causing the bridle line to wrap around the deploying rigging lines, preventing them from extracting the reserve from the 'free bag.' The main was then released, which then put further tension on the wrapped bridle line as the pilot chute was being dragged by the 'free bag' which was now 'in tow'. At this stage there was nothing he could do to rectify the situation. The recommendations of the Board are that all parachutists should be reminded of the importance of carrying out emergency drills in the correct sequence.|